


Tightening the z/VM Environment after initial installation

Sam Cohen Levi, Ray & Shoup, Inc. Email: sam.cohen@lrs.com



Agenda

- z/VM Background
- z/VM Security
- Issues with z/VM-supplied security settings
- "Tightening" the security environment
- Preparing for an external security manager





z/VM Background

- z/VM's CP (Control Program) provides for management of real resources and definition of virtual machines with (only) virtual resources
- CP can define virtual hardware where there is no equivalent in the real hardware
- More granular/flexible than Logical Partitioning (LPAR)




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System Startup

- Load from device containing CP nucleus (&SYSRES)
- CP reads file on System Parameter device (&SYSPARM) to determine resources and environment (default file: SYSTEM CONFIG)
- CP reads previously-compiled directory of virtual machines (allocated as DRCT space on &SYSRES)
- CP automatically starts virtual machines specified in SYSTEM CONFIG





z/VM Security

Authentication

- Userid/Password combination
- Minidisk passwords



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Authorization

- Resources (Real and Virtual)
- CP Commands



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Auditing and Logging



Authentication

Controlled by z/VM Directory

- Each virtual machine is defined by a USER or IDENTITY statement
- Contains name of virtual machine (userid) and logon password
- Contains passwords for accessing minidisks
 - Positional entries on MDISK statement
 - Read password
 - Write password
 - Multiuser password
 - Value of "ALL" means unrestricted access



Authorization

Real Resources

- Access controlled by:
 - I/O Configuration Dataset (IOCDS)
 - Defined by HCD/HCM or compiled IOCP source
 - z/VM Directory
 - Minidisk definitions
 - Link to other users' minidisks (mdisk passwords not required)
 - Shared Filesystem (SFS) grants (file-level or directory-level)
 - Byte Filesystem (BFS) owner/group/world permissions



Authorization

Virtual Resources

- Access controlled by:
 - SYSTEM CONFIG file
 - Restricted vs. Unrestricted virtual devices (example: Guest LANs)
 - z/VM Directory
 - Virtual machine memory sizes
 - Inter-user communication
 - Virtual devices
 - Dynamically-defined virtual devices
 - Virtual terminals
 - Virtual NICs
 - Virtual CTCs
 - Virtual disks in memory
 - Are deleted when virtual machine is logged off



Auditing and Logging

- VM Event Records
- Operator Messages
- Secondary Console Interface (SCIF) Messages
- Virtual Machine Console Logs



Auditing and Logging

- VM Event Records
- Operator Messages
- Secondary Console Interface (SCIF) Messages
- Virtual Machine Console Logs
- IBM-provided Programmable Operator (PROP) can record Operator and SCIF messages
- User-written Execs (in REXX) can capture virtual machine console logs
- SYSTEM CONFIG options allow journaling of improper duplicate logon attempts



Issues with z/VM-supplied security settings



Issues with z/VM-supplied security settings

Initial Authorization and Authentication:

- SYSTEM CONFIG file
 - Activates all sensed devices visible to the LPAR (by I/O Subsystem via IOCDS)
 - Prompts for spool startup mode and TOD change
 - Note: There is no "TOD Enable" button on current hardware
 - Ability to enter visible passwords (on command-line logon, link statements)
 - No notification of multiple logon attempts with invalid passwords

VM Directory

- Userids have known passwords
 - · Passwords documented in z/VM Installation Manual
 - · Limited use of special passwords to restrict access (more later)
- All minidisk definitions have common or easily guessed passwords
 - READ/WRITE/MULTIPLE
 - Ruserid/Wuserid/Muserid

Initial Auditing and Logging:

- CP messages go to the userid defined to CP as the "System Operator"
 - Default ID = OPERATOR
- No logging of directory changes
- · No logging of system changes made by a superuser



"Tightening" the Security Environment



SYSTEM CONFIG file

- Remove the system operator from startup decisions during normal operations
 - Enable the following features,
 - AUTO_IPL
 - AUTO_IPL_AFTER_RESTART
 - AUTO_IPL_AFTER_SHUTDOWN_REIPL
 - If set to FORCE, the operator is only prompted if spool file destruction may occur
- Turn off PASSWORDS_ON_CMDs
- Define Virtual LANs/Switches here instead of AUTOLOG1
- Create new CP command classes allow subsets of IBM-supplied command classes.
 - Examples: FORCE, SET SECUSER, SIGNAL SHUTDOWN, XAUTOLOG
- Enable Journaling to track invalid logon attempts
- Use IMBED files for frequently changed sections
- Use –system–, &SYSRES and &SYSPARM variables to reduce complexity



Example of modified SYSTEM CONFIG

*************	************	************	*******************************	:*****/
*		nd Warmstart 1		*/
*****	****	******	******	
System_Reside	ence,			
Checkpoint	Volid &SYSRES	rom CYL 21	For 9 ,	
Warmstart	Volid &SYSRES	rom CYL 30	For 9	
		******	******	,
* System-uniqu			*****	*/
*****	******	*****	*******	*****/
TMPED system				
IMBED -system	I- VULSERS			
****	****	**********	*****	*****/
* Journaling				*/
	****	**********	*****	
				'
Journal Facil	lity ON Set and	Duerv ON .		
Logon Lockout After 3 Attempts for 5 Minutes ,				
	GO After 3 Atte		,	
_				
	****	******	******	*****/
*		ures Statemer		*/
***********	*****	*********	******	*****/
Features ,	Deside the	1* 61		* /
Auto_IPL For		/* Startı	up options	*/
	er_Restart Force er Shutdown Rei			
Enable ,	.er_shucuowh_ker		, the following featur	noc */
STP TZ ,		/ LIIADIG	e the following feature	es /
	s Initialized W	en Added /	Make new devices onli	ne */
Disable ,	.s_inicialized_w		le the following featur	
Dynamic IC).	, 01500.	te the following featur	c5 /
Set Dynami				
Set Privcl		/* Disal	low SET PRIVCLASS comma	and */
Clear TDis			clear TDisks at IPL ti	
Validate S			require system name	*/
Retrieve ,		/* Retrie	eve options	*/
Default 2	20,	/* Defau	lt default is 20	*/
Maximum 2	255 ,	/* Maximu	um default is 255	*/
MaxUsers nol	.imit ,		nit on number of users	*/
Passwords_or	_Cmds ,		commands allow password	ls? */
Autolog r	10,		JTOLOG does	*/
	10 ,	/* Li		*/
	10 ,		nd LOGON does, too	*/
	im 144000 blocks		um vdisk allowed per us	
Disconnect 1	imeout 15	/* Can be	• OFF. default is 15 mi	in */

Contents of system-1 VOLSERS:

User_Volume_List VM1WK1 User_Volume_Include VM1* User_Volume_Exclude VM2*

Contents of *system-2* VOLSERS:

User_Volume_List VM2WK1 User_Volume_Include VM2* User_Volume_Exclude VM1*







Know and use "reserved" passwords

• NOPASS



Know and use "reserved" passwords

NOPASS No password required for logon



- NOPASS No password required for logon
- AUTOONLY



- NOPASS No password required for logon
- AUTOONLY Similar to started task/process



- NOPASS No password required for logon
- AUTOONLY Similar to started task/process
- NOLOG



- NOPASS No password required for logon
- AUTOONLY Similar to started task/process
- NOLOG Logon not permitted



- NOPASS No password required for logon
- AUTOONLY Similar to started task/process
- NOLOG Logon not permitted
- LBYONLY



- NOPASS No password required for logon
- AUTOONLY Similar to started task/process
- NOLOG Logon not permitted
- LBYONLY Use Surrogate Userid for logon



Authentication Techniques

- Set all IBM-provided IDs that you don't use to NOLOG
 - · Don't delete these definitions, otherwise system upgrades will be impacted
- Define "real" administrative users and LOGONBY to superuser virtual machines
 - Caution: These admin users should be subject to password management policies...but keep a "break-glass" password to MAINT in case all LOGONBY users get locked out.
- Set used IBM-provided service virtual machines to AUTOONLY
- Remove obsolete virtual machines after a version upgrade
 - For example, OSA/SF is gone from z/VM V7, but not deleted via the upgrade installation method, you should manually remove the virtual machines defined for OSA/SF
- Delete all Minidisk passwords, except for certain limited disks needing the universal read password of ALL:
 - MAINT190/193/19D/19E/402
 TCPMAINT 592
- Carefully consider impact of IUCV ANY
- Don't 'overauthorize' CP commands to a virtual machine
 - Define new command classes to avoid full CP CLASS authority when not needed



Additional Directory Cleanup

- Use Directory Profiles
 - Use profile IBMDFLT for the entries that don't use any profile
 - Only use in-line values that differ from the profile entry
- Eliminate duplication within the IBM-supplied directory:
 - Use GLOBALOPTS MACHINE ESA and remove individual MACHINE ESA specifications
 - Move common TCPMAINT LINKS in individual TCP/IP entries to profiles TCPCMSU and TCPGCSU
 - Move non-version-specific LINK entries in SUBCONFIG clauses to the related USER or IDENTITY clauses
 - Keep version-specific links in SUBCONFIGs, since new versions are installed one LPAR at a time
- Cleanup like this speeds up DIRECTXA processing and reduces the size of the directory stored in DRCT space



Example of Directory Cleanup

IDENTITY SYSMON WD5JU8QP 32M 32M DG BUILD ON DEMOVM1 USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-1 BUILD ON DEMOVM2 USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-2 * BUILD ON @@member3name USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-3 * BUILD ON @@member4name USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-4 ACCOUNT 1 SYSMON MACHINE ESA **IPL CMS PARM AUTOCR** CONSOLE 01F 3215 SPOOL 00C 2540 READER A SPOOL 00D 2540 PUNCH A SPOOL 00E 1403 A SUBCONFIG SYSMON-1 LINK MAINT 190 190 RR LINK MAINT 19D 19D RR LINK MAINT 193 193 RR MDISK 191 3390 03030 005 VM1RES MR RSYSMON WSYSMON MSYSMON SUBCONFIG SYSMON-2 LINK MAINT 190 190 RR LINK MAINT 19D 19D RR LINK MAINT 193 193 RR MDISK 191 3390 03030 005 VM2RES MR RSYSMON WSYSMON MSYSMON *SUBCONFIG SYSMON-3 * LINK MAINT 190 190 RR * LINK MAINT 19D 19D RR * LINK MAINT 193 193 RR *SUBCONFIG SYSMON-4 * LINK MAINT 190 190 RR * LINK MAINT 19D 19D RR * LINK MAINT 193 193 RR

IDENTITY SYSMON WD5JU8QP 32M 32M DG INCLUDE IBMDFLT BUILD ON DEMOVM1 USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-1 BUILD ON DEMOVM2 USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-2

* BUILD ON @@member3name USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-3 * BUILD ON @@member4name USING SUBCONFIG SYSMON-4 ACCOUNT 1 SYSMON IPL CMS PARM AUTOCR LINK MAINT 193 193 RR

SUBCONFIG SYSMON-1 MDISK 191 3390 03030 005 VM1RES MR

SUBCONFIG SYSMON-2 MDISK 191 3390 03030 005 VM2RES MR

*SUBCONFIG SYSMON-3 *SUBCONFIG SYSMON-4



Auditing/Logging

- Use IBM Directory Maintenance Tool or similar
 - Logs all directory transactions
 - User password management (simple)
 - Limited policy enforcement
 - Number of characters
 - Password history
 - · Expiration notices via reader notes
 - Userid is NOLOG'd upon expiration, administrator must reenable
 - IBM-provided exits synchronize directory changes with Security Server (RACF)
- Use CP Operator Message capturing tool
 - Programmable Operator (PROP)
 - Performance Toolkit
- Use virtual machine VMUTIL for time-based activities
 - Send daily virtual machine console logs to a collector
- Operations Manager for z/VM can also perform these nondirectory functions



Preparing for an external security manager

Why consider an external security manager?

- Limitations of z/VM Directory
 - 8 LOGONBY userids per virtual machine
 - Up to 8-character passwords
 - No passphrases
 - Passwords stored on disk in clear text (EBCDIC)
 - Need more granular access to resources for superusers
- Limitations of DirMaint
 - Limited password validation
 - Crude password change mechanism
- Single collection point for access logs
- · Single point of authorization for CMS users

Note that an external security manager does <u>not</u> control security inside a "bare metal" operating system running in a virtual machine



Preparing for an external security manager

Determine what resources you need to protect

- Do you really need to protect access to spool files?
- · Do you really need to protect access to minidisks if there are no passwords associated with minidisks?
- Do you really need to protect resources for batch execution (under CMS)?
- Do you really need to protect CP commands if you have created custom command classes?

Prepare the z/VM Directory for loading the security database

- · Use ACIGROUP directory statements to define virtual machines with a similar purpose
 - The ACIGROUP will be used to define the virtual machine's default group
 - Put the ACIGROUP statement in the PROFILE; override only on virtual machines that need to be in a different group

Run the IBM-supplied utility to build the initial RACF commands

- Remove the resource definitions that won't be tracked
- Remove the class activations for resources that won't be tracked

Update RACF exits to minimize security database access

- Primarily access the VM directory for most authorizations
- Don't bother authorizing minidisks with universal READ access (ALL in the minidisk read password position)

Select DirMaint exits to send RACF updates only for resources that are being protected by RACF

• If you are only protecting userids/passwords with RACF, don't send directory updates for minidisks, spool, etc.



References

- CP Planning and Administration (SC24-6175)
- CMS Planning and Administration (SC24-6171)
- Directory Maintenance Facility Tailoring and Administration (SC24-6190)
- Performance Toolkit Guide (SC24-6209)